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The political party Kotlebovci – People’s Party Our Slovakia 
(Kotlebovci – Ľudová strana Naše Slovensko) is a far-right 
political group in Slovakia. Though the Political Party of Marian 
Kotleba had previously been dissolved by the Supreme Court of 
the Slovak Republic, this marginal political party became 
a parliamentary political formation after the parliamentary 
elections in March 2016 when fourteen of their members won 
seats in the 150-member parliament. The Slovak President Andrej 
Kiska refused to invite its leader, Marian Kotleba, who was 
labelled as a fascist, to visit the statehouse. The media and analysts 
also frequently label this political party as extremist or fascist. It 
is not easy to evaluate the ideological and value orientation of 
political parties, but there are theoretical concepts presented by 
relevant authors such as Beyme, Mudde, Drábik and Mair. These 
ideas form the  basis of our study. The study seeks to find the 
answer to the problematic question of whether or not it is possible 
to brand this party as (neo)fascist in terms of theory, methodology 
and terminology. There was a proposal by the General 
Prosecutor's Office to dissolve the current political party of 
Marian Kotleba. Therefore it is the responsibility of other social 
sciences such as political sciences or history, to help the state to 
intervene against the enemies of democracy and tolerance. 
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Introduction 
In Slovakia in the early 1990s, the exiles that communists called 
clerical-fascist, who survived the regime, and their successors, started to 
mobilise again. The right extremists from the skinhead movement or neo-Nazis 
meet with the “Old Guard”  every year on 14 March at the grave of the president 
of the Slovak State, Jozef Tiso, who was sentenced and executed in 1947 for 
war crimes or crimes against humanity. The far right Slovak National Party 
(Slovenská národná strana), especially while it was led by Ján Slota, was 
famous for its political agenda built on nationalism and preservation of 
conservative values, with a refusal to accept a liberal agenda in cultural and 
ethical issues. This party also played on the “Hungarian card” and the “Roma 
card” and was always part of the political mainstream. However, the political 
grouping Kotlebovci – People’s Party Our Slovakia, that became a part of 
parliament after the 2016 and 2020 parliamentary elections, has a completely 
different past and present. Some media and political analysts label them as 
fascists and extremists. However it is a question as to whether or not experts 
can afford to call them such. There are a number of theoretical and 
methodological problems concerning the classification of such groups. The 
Slovak specificities, historical background and other matters should be 
considered. Social sciences can unlikely to provide us with the exact answer, 
but we will try to find at least some answers. The study would be a success if 
it engages further discussions on these questions, constructive criticism as well 
as challenges. It would be a step forward in examining the contemporary far 
right political scene. 
In Slovakia, though we might think we can know in practice what 
fascism is, its current form confuses us. It is often presented as populism and 
radicalization or anti-system and a protest political force. Citizens disregard 
symbolism and open features of fascist ideology. Worse, politicians or the 
judiciary also cannot agree on the clear signs of neo-fascism. They fail in the 
moral and legal condemnation of these acts. Furthermore, it is a question as to 
whether or not to ostracize such political parties when they were democratically 
elected by citizens. The judiciary still lacks experts on both political and 
religious extremism. Then there is the issue of freedom of speech, which every 
judge sees differently. As we know, the enemies of the system often abuse the 
freedom of speech. Finally, some academics also say that the terms 
“extremism” or “fascism” are overused. 
The past has shown that democracy had the greatest weakness in the 
sense that extremist or totalitarian opinion streams, protected under the right to 
freedom of expression, could be presented in a competition of political opinions 
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and ideas, and were so successful that their supporters were elected to the 
legislature, where they could democratically simply remove democratic 
principles, eventually destroying the democratic face of the country, with a de 
facto totalitarian environment that had nothing to do with democracy. 
If we have to answer the question of whether the Kotleba political party 
is (neo)fascist, the answer is clearly yes. There are significant evidence, 
arguments and reasons that this is so. Based on theory and analytical research, 
we will try to prove this claim. 
Our article is divided into questions of methodological clarification of 
the studied issue. Then we will deal with the terminology and the review of 
literature on fascism, extreme right and political radicalism and political 
extremism. In the following part we will describe the specific aspects of the 
extreme right in Slovakia. We also describe the predecessors of the political 
party Kotlebovci - ĽSNS and finally, in the analytical part, we analyse that 
political party in terms of its value and ideological orientation. In conclusion, 
we present more arguments for why we believe that ĽSNS is a fascist political 
party. 
 
Methodological insertion   
This case study is built on a qualitative methodology. Hanzel (2009) 
speaks about ontological character of data. According to that, qualitative data 
is intentionalist and includes values, beliefs and intentions. In social sciences, 
Drulák (2008) distinguishes between two basic epistemological positions. The 
former seeks to explain the world and the latter wants to understand the world 
or interpret it. This directly translates in the methodology. The qualitative 
methodology is divided into explanatory and interpretative approaches. Our 
case study chooses the interpretative approach with the aim to reconstruct the 
subjective or shared meanings that individuals and groups attribute to the 
reality. The interpretation, being an analysis of these meanings, then allows to 
understand actions of the individuals and groups examined. Qualitative 
methodology is highly dependent on the research context and its application is 
almost always a creative act. Such research is influenced more by subjective 
abilities and visions of the researcher. However, it is necessary to respect the 
so-called hermeneutic circle which means that individual parts (for example, 
parts of the text) cannot be understood without understanding the whole and, 
vice versa, the whole will not be understood without understanding its 
individual parts. We approach individual parts with certain presuppositions that 
are based on ideas about the whole.  
The theoretic framework clarifying the conceptual apparatus and 
characteristics of the far right political groupings, radicalism, extremism (also 
in the form of (neo)fascism) is, simultaneously to the academic interpretation 
of the value-ideological base of these subjects from the point of view of social 
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scientists (especially historians, sociologists, political philosophers and 
political scientists), fertile ground for the analytical part of the study, where the 
identification of values, standards and procedures that can be considered far 
right plays an important role. It is a basis for examination of the selected 
political groups. 
We agree with many authors (Beyme 1985; Mudde, Mair, 1998; 
Gallagher, Mair, Laver, 2005; Rybář, 2003; Hloušek, Kopeček, 2010) that the 
genesis of a political party has an irreplaceable role in assessing political 
groups. For this reason, we analyse the genealogy and development of  
Kotleba´s political party from its formation.  
Rybář (2003) suggests that the so-called voluntarist factor, when the 
leader or leaders of a new political party set the ideology and programme of the 
party according to their own preferences is an important element in this 
discussion. Žuborová (2011) believes that party leaders play an important role 
within their political parties. They create the overall political image not only in 
relation to society but also to the other political parties within the system. With 
the growth of new communication tools, in relation to political communication, 
the power and dominant position of party leaders proportionally reinforces the 
growth of the party. Mudde, Mair, 1998; Gallagher, Mair, Laver, 2005; Rybář, 
2003; and Hloušek, Kopeček, 2010 consistently consider leadership as a 
necessary factor to assess when classifying the party into the theoretical 
concept of party families.  
Beyme (1985) prefers an ideological approach more than a programme 
approach. Using party documents such as statute, general policy, and party 
vision, we focus on the position of ideology and values. In programme 
documents, we describe and evaluate the resolutions that can be evaluated 
according to the theoretical framework. We analyse the election manifesto of 
the party in the parliamentary elections in 2012 and 2016. We also analyse the 
political party through its past political decisions and declarations, where we 
present extracts of real and principal decisions. In some cases, we describe the 
proposals made by the officials of the political party as an opposition political 
group or we describe the decisions of party authorities and ideologists, 
supported by the political party that they represent. A certain extent of 
subjectification cannot be avoided but again it colours the picture of the 
behaviour of the political party and its officials in practice. 
It is clear that such methodology is not complete. The impact of 
subjective characteristics of the researcher for data collection and evaluation is 
possible in a number of respects. The greatest degree of subjectivism may arise 
when selecting the policies implemented by the political party that may be 
largely adapted to the preferences of the researcher. Neither can the objective 
overall evaluation of the study be utterly guaranteed. Therefore, we will not 
formulate a hypothesis that should be a sort of a statement of belief. We believe 
that to categorically label the party as fascist, whether the study confirmed or 
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rejected the hypothesis would not be absolutely accurate. The truth does not 
lie somewhere in between since there are so many variables that it is likely that 
the answer will be in a latent form. The reader should not find the answer 
between the lines. In this study the journey is the destination.  
 
On literature review: About (neo)fascism, extreme right, political 
radicalism and extremism 
Comparative studies of fascism have begun to address its more 
ideological and cultural dimension. Analysis of so-called generic fascism have 
actually shifted from a sociological point of view to a more political one in the 
past twenty years and emphasize that ideology and culture were far more 
important for the fascists than we had previously thought. The current interest 
in fascism has undoubtedly been encouraged by Griffin's work The Nature of 
Fascism, which has sparked many debates, as well as by the contributions of 
Eatwell and Payne. Definitions as such are never true or false, they can only be 
viewed with varying degrees of utility and suitability. In particular, a new 
generation of historians, such as Kallis, Iordachi, Love, Umland, Baker, 
Shekhovtsov, and Costa Pinto, follow up on Griffin's work. There are several 
different, often contradictory definitions of the term “fascism”. This is mainly 
due to the fact that there are many different ways to look at fascism: through 
ideology, through the actions of fascists themselves, through the socio-
economic conditions in which fascism originated. Even the fascist movements, 
which were based on different national history and traditions and lived in other 
national realities, are quite different (Drábik, 2014). Mikušovič (2012) presents 
the term “extreme right” as based on political studies, through two different 
theories. One is a theory of party families, where far right parties have their 
own family. Such political parties share their ideological base consisting of the 
following signs: nationalism, xenophobia, programme of chauvinist social 
security and a belief in law and order. The second is a theory of extremism that 
understands the extreme right as an umbrella term involving right-wing 
radicalism and right-wing extremism.  
The resolution of the Council of Europe no. 1344 of 25 September 2003 
states that extremism, whatever its nature, is a form of political activity that 
overtly or covertly rejects the principles of parliamentary democracy, and often 
bases its ideology and its political practices and conduct on intolerance, 
exclusion, xenophobia, anti-Semitism and ultra-nationalism. Political 
extremism is directed against the democratic constitutional state. In democratic 
countries it is active through political parties, interest groups, social movements 
and subcultures (Mareš, 2003). 
Cas Mudde (1995) claims that the origin of the term right-wing 
extremism and the studies of  right-wing extremism are based on the study of 
fascism. He defines right-wing extremism as an ideology that contains several 
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elements: nationalism, racism, xenophobia, anti-democracy and strong state. 
Right-wing radicalism has become a collective term for new far right parties 
and (neo-)fascist and (neo-)Nazi parties. Ignazi (1995) agrees with Mudde in 
considering fascism as the only ideological body for the extreme right. 
The primary criterion that is mentioned most frequently when 
examining these parties is, according to Mudde (1995), ideology. Most studies 
examine the ideology of a party solely through an analyse their statutes, party 
platforms or different party manifestos. However, there are also voices taking 
the view that these sources of analyses are not satisfactory to understand right-
wing extremist parties because these parties cannot and do not want to tactically 
show their colours. Apart from other aspects, the election manifestos of 
political parties focus on pleasing their members and voters and on promoting 
their public image. Behind this “front line” the extremist parties have a far more 
radical “background” that may be hidden.  
However, as Mikušovič (2012a) rightly stresses, not all far right parties 
can be defined on the basis of their relation to democracy. Some of them 
absolutely lack any criticism of democratic institutions, nevertheless, they are 
labelled as the extreme right because of their rhetoric and ideology, in which 
different traditional extreme right issues are present. These parties are then 
characterised on the basis of their political style and represent ultra-right-wing 
populism. 
A Slovak expert on this topic, Tomáš Nociar (2016), published an 
article in this context entitled “Political scientist’s guide through a 
“terminological chaos”: Terminology, characterisation and conceptualization 
of the far-right ideological family”. Based on prevailing interpretations as well 
as interpretations of individual terms defined by Cas Mudde, he conceptualized 
the far right ideological family according to its ideological family tree. The 
trunk consists of the individual ideological features of the extreme right and the 
crown consists of the individual branches of the extreme right. The most 
common concept presents the extreme right comprising of nativism 
(xenophobic nationalism) and authoritarianism. The extreme right is further 
divided into the radical right (nativism, authoritarianism, anti-liberal-
democratic sentiment); populistic to the radical right (nativism, 
authoritarianism, anti-liberal-democratic sentiment, other populistic traits 
dividing society between “pure people“ and “corrupted elites”); the extreme 
right (nativism, authoritarianism, antidemocratic sentiment); neo-fascism 
(nativism, authoritarianism, antidemocratic sentiment, ideological continuity 
with the fascist regime); neo-Nazism (nativism, authoritarianism, 
antidemocratic sentiment, ideological continuity with the Nazi regime – 
biological racism and anti-Semitism). For the sake of heterogeneity Nociar 
believes that the extreme right is the most suitable term to refer to these political 
groups. 
 
The entry of an extreme right party into the Slovak parlament… 
 
Balkan Social Science Review Vol.16, December 2020, 175-197                181 
 
The political scientist Mareš (2003), when discussing terminology, 
draws attention to the problem of the overuse of the term “extremist” in the 
media discourse. In many cases the mainstream parties, in order to deliberately 
delegitimize some groups, label them as “extreme”. Therefore, Mareš suggests 
using the term “extreme right” for extremist and radical formations. Eremina 
and Seredenko (2015) even suggest the term “socially dangerous” be used 
when discussing these political parties. 
In this study it is important to give more detailed attention to the term 
(neo)fascism and the contemporary view of it. Kopeček (2007) defines fascism 
as a negation of rationalism, progress, freedom and equality, and generally 
everything connected to the year of 1789, which is associated with the Great 
French Revolution and subsequent changes in society. Fascism was also 
characterised by rejection of capitalism, liberalism, communism, democracy 
and the parliamentary system. Fascism features the idealization of the nation 
and the constant “struggle” of nations for supremacy within the socio-
Darwinian notion as the fundamental impulse of history. Fascism is also 
characterised by applying the leadership principle and the cult of the leader, 
heroism and corporatism functioning within society. 
Fascism is according to Drábik (2019, p. 27) “a type of revolutionary 
nationalism characterized by obsessive notions of the disintegration of society, 
decadence, and national humiliation. At the same time, it seeks (usually by 
force) to achieve utopian national rebirth by cleansing the nation of enemies 
and creating a new political and social order and a new man” For key 
characteristics of fascism considered Drábik (2019) revolutionary, ultra-
nationalism and racism, ideas about the decline of the society, national rebirth, 
violence and paramilitarism, cleanse the nation from enemies, introduction of 
a new order and create a new man. 
Karapin (1998) writes that successful far right parties today have 
organizational and personal connections to pre-1945 fascists or Nazis, adopt 
programmes that are similar to fascism and seek to resurrect or create fascist 
regimes. Therefore, they use quasi-fascist appeals to play upon current 
resentment, such as immigration and unemployment, and try specifically to 
mobilize middle class support (“petite bourgeoisie”).  
The historian Copsey (2013) published an interesting article entitled 
“Fascism... but with an open mind” in which he deals with new forms of 
fascism or neo-fascism.  Upon hearing from a student who declared himself a 
“fascist but one with an open mind”, Copsey asks how “can fascism, a 
demonized ideology, a by-word for genocide driven by fanaticism possess 
anything approaching an open-mind? When it comes to understanding 
developments on the contemporary far right in Western Europe, we have really 
witnessed the emergence of a “new” breed of fascists” (Copsey, 2013, p. 1). 
Copsey asks if neo-fascism had adapted itself to the norms of multi-ethnic, 
liberal-democratic society. By the mid-1990s, growing numbers of political 
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scientists were insisting that Western Europe had not experienced any upsurge 
in “neo-fascism” but the emergence of a new kind of politics entirely, defined 
as radical right-wing populism. It was proposed that the emergence of 
exclusionary populist ideology should have absolutely nothing to do with a 
revival of fascism or “neo-fascism in postmodern guise”. What follows is a 
widely shared belief that the populist radical right is not neo-fascism, but 
neither is it simply a moderate form of the extreme right. According to Copsey 
it surely is a mistake to argue that neo-fascism has played a minimal role in 
defining the ideological and discursive practices of the contemporary far right. 
The fact that right-wing populists feel it necessary to repeatedly draw a clear 
line, in public at least, between themselves and the “extreme right” also tells us 
much about the extent to which both the “radical right” and “extreme right” 
mingle. The boundaries for political scientists, according to Copsey, have 
become blurred. 
 
Specific aspects of the extreme right in Slovakia 
The political scientist Mesežnikov (2011) identifies a set of factors that 
determine a relatively suitable social mobilization of the extreme right in 
Slovakia. It concerns a multi-ethnic composition of population, the 
unfavourable situation of the Roma minority, the aforementioned ideological 
and political legacy of the local fascism from the first half of the 20th century 
and growing revisionist elements in the official historical science. Right-wing 
extremism in Slovakia is differentiated by Nociar (2012) into two players. On 
the one hand, a group of skinheads and “resistance groups” that operate 
informally and independently of political parties, with no permanent 
organizational structure, and, on the other hand, there are the civic 
organizations and political parties seeking to create permanent institutionalized 
right-wing extremist structures. The well-known and most successful of these 
latter include Slovak Brotherhood (Slovenská pospolitosť) and Kotlebovci – 
the People’s Party Our Slovakia (Kotlebovci – Ľudová strana Naše Slovensko, 
Kotlebovci – ĽSNS). Mikušovič (2012b) divides the Slovak extreme right 
according to their programmes into two basic streams: a) an ultra-nationalist 
stream – characterised by a strong bond to the clerical-fascist nature of the 
Slovak State, specifically anti-Semitism resulting from local traditions, and in 
particular, radical chauvinism directed especially against Hungarians; b) a neo-
Nazi stream – defined by their allegiance to the German Third Reich and the 
policy of German National Socialism, including the principle of a superior 
Aryan race, including deeply rooted anti-Semitism and the long-term denial of 
the Holocaust. 
Kotleba´s political party is characterised by its attachment to Ludaks’ 
ideology, ideas and ideology the Slovak State as a Slovak version of fascism, 
aspirations to rehabilitate its representatives, strong resistance against 
Hungarians who are blamed for their aspirations to integrate the southern areas 
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of Slovakia, and anti-Semitism. Further, it is anti-American, rejects the EU, 
NATO and other international organizations, emphasizes morality and 
“Christian” values that, according to them, the modern culture threatens and 
destroys, aspires to enter into politics and populistic rhetoric, and also resists 
and rejects liberalism (Mlynárčiková et al., 2010). 
 
Ideological and institutional predecessors of the party Kotlebovci - 
ĽSNS 
The resistance groups have a tendency, according to Nociar (2012), to 
support official nationalist parties. Since 2003, when the public awareness of 
the Slovak Brotherhood (SP) and its later political branches arose, a continuous 
growth in the political support of these organizations has been seen.  
The Slovak Brotherhood (SP) has been the best-known organization 
among the Slovak ultra-right groups. Due to its appearance in the media, it has 
become a synonym for the Slovak right-wing extremism as such. It has gained 
a significant status by organizing torch marches and commemorative events in 
Slovak cities, in which its members marched dressed in dark-blue uniforms. 
However, lately it has also entered into the election competition and its 
programme has become more sophisticated. The programme concept of the 
new political party was indicated by its leader, Marian Kotleba, in his speech 
in Modra, in which he refutiated parliamentary democracy, and embraced 
corporatist directions of the war-time Slovak State in connection to solving the 
Jewish question. He talked about driving the Jews out of the country as the 
optimal solution to the Jewish question. The programme was introduced to the 
public at the 66th anniversary of the creation of the Slovak State in Bratislava. 
The document, with the goal to assault communists, liberals and Zionists and 
build the welfare of the “beloved Slovak State”, presents the conditions of the 
Slovak ultra-right as a unique and comprehensive ideological starting point to 
change the political system and eliminate liberal democracy. The SP-NS 
People’s Programme has encoded principles of chauvinism, anti-Semitism, 
discrimination and inequality. One of the fundamental programme principles 
of this political party is neo-Ludakism. SP-NS is based on the tradition of the 
war-time Slovak State as the first independent state of the Slovak nation, but it 
clearly focuses on its political system that, according to SP-NS, approached a 
lot the corporatist arrangements that they pursue (Mikušovič, 2007). 
Kotleba´s sharp anti-Semitic statements have also been documented. 
On 14 March 2004 in Bratislava, in one of his lesser known speeches, through 
a quote from Ľudovít Štúr about the Jews as an alien nation, he claimed that 
“Štúr talked about these devils in human skin.” Photographs of the Nazi 
henchman Rudolf Hess were found among the candidates of the ĽSNS and they 
took photographs with the insignia used by the SS forces (Mikušovič, 2013). 
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According to Nociar (2012), the ideology of the Slovak Brotherhood 
combines the traditional issues of extreme nationalism, racism, anti-Semitism, 
neo-fascism and in some aspects also neo-Nazism. It opposes pluralism 
and liberal economy, promotes economic paternalism, and supports 
nationalism, xenophobia, and authoritarianism. It embraces conspiracy theories 
and expresses nationalist-populist requirements. In relation to ethnic 
minorities, the Slovak Brotherhood proposes to apply the principle of 
reciprocity so that political representation of a specific national minority 
reflects the representation of the Slovak minority in the country from which the 
minority comes. These arrangements would mean an actual inequality in the 
weight of voices. The authors of the 2009 SP-NS programme objectives that 
later became the programme objectives of the new intended political party. 
Apart from several items new political programme is identical, there was just 
one major change: a call for replacement of the representative democracy with 
direct democracy. 
The Slovak Brotherhood became a synonym of Slovak right-wing 
extremism as such, though eventually, the SP-NS was dissolved by the order 
of the Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic on 1 March 2006 (Mikušovič, 
2007). 
The right-wing extremist scene then, according to Nociar (2012), tried 
to rid itself of the skinhead image and lifestyle, and to gain wider public 
acceptance. Its strategy was modified. The Slovak Brotherhood drew its main 
attention to nostalgia for the fascist regime and stronger anti-Roma attitudes, 
which increased their popularity. This may be linked to a number of activities 
against “Roma crime” that it co-organized in summer 2009. The public support 
encouraged the SP to carry out further mobilization activities, mostly on the 
anti-Roma topic. Encouraged by the public support, Marian Kotleba, the former 
SP-NS leader, became one of the main figures of the demonstrations.  
 
Kotlebovci – ĽSNS: Populistic radicals or (neo)fascist extremists?  
The People’s Party Our Slovakia (Ľudová strana Naše Slovensko, 
ĽSNS) emerged, according to Nociar (2012), as a result of the aforementioned 
aspirations of the SP-NS to revive its activities. In the late summer of 2009 the 
intention to establish a new political entity called Our Slovakia (Naše 
Slovensko) and take part in the upcoming parliamentary elections was 
announced. Its programme objectives were almost identical to the ones from 
January 2009. T 
The ĽSNS was founded in the beginning of 2010. Its website contains 
the slogan “with courage against the system”. They call Roma “anti-social 
parasites” who abuse the social system and are a source of a high crime rate. 
However, the ĽSNS leaders reject such attributes and seek to reclassify the term 
extremism by introducing the term “Gypsy extremism”.  
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The second major theme in the ĽSNS rhetoric is its criticism of and 
attempts to discredit established political parties and elites, against which the 
party tries to adopt a tough stance, presenting the parties and the elites as 
spoiled, removed from the reality, and indifferent to the problems of ordinary 
citizens. Anti-Semitism is not addressed as much as in the SP-NS. The ĽSNS 
programme, presented as election manifesto for the 2010 and 2012 
parliamentary elections, in no way represented an elaborate political 
programme. Rather it included populistic slogans in the spirit of anti-Roma 
rhetoric, social chauvinism, paternalism, with the emphasis on law and order, 
and criticism of political leaders in the country and their foreign policy (Nociar, 
2012). 
To this they add that they are in the position of martyrs, suffering for 
their beliefs under police truncheons. Definitely the main issue is racism, 
through which they won sympathy from some members of the majority 
population in the locations with segregated Roma settlements. The ĽSNS 
representatives systematically look for social conflicts and striking crime cases 
to which they later attach racist undertones (Antifa.cz, 2010).  
In the 2010 parliamentary elections the party with their then-separate 
candidate list won 1.33% of the votes (33,724 votes) and in the 2012 early 
elections their result increased to 1.58% (40,460 votes). After the 2012 
elections, the ĽSNS, according to their website, “names the most serious 
problems by their correct names and is not afraid of putting large patches over 
large holes” (Naseslovensko.net, 2013). With the party slogan “For decent 
people! Against parasites!”, the ĽSNS started to gradually focus its manifesto 
on sharp criticism of the situation in the country. On the one hand, they 
criticised the behaviour of established political parties and government officials 
and their policies directed against “decent Slovaks”, and on the other hand, they 
sharply criticised the free-rider problem of the Roma population and “the 
Gypsy extremism and terror”. This agenda was disseminated at meetings in the 
locations which have problems with Roma settlements or individual Roma 
inhabitants (Kluknavská, 2012). 
The party’s first-ever election victory may have been Marian Kotleba’s 
victory in the second round of the 2013 regional elections. In that election he 
was elected as President of the Banská Bystrica Self-Governing Region with 
71,397 (55.53 %) votes of all eligible votes cast (Štatistický úrad Slovenskej 
republiky, 2020). The influence of this election was soon evident. The 
periodical Bystrický kraj, published by the Banská Bystrica regional 
government, led by Marian Kotleba, featured an article on debt reduction with 
an illustrative picture taken from an anti-Jewish cartoon. In the original cartoon 
there is also a text saying “With Jews You Lose” next to the character. The 
Banská Bystrica regional government began publication of he letter-box 
newspaper Bystrický kraj soon after the members of the regional parliament 
did not approve a budget item to publish the former periodical Náš kraj. This 
latter publication featured articles that mentioned Tiso’s regime in a positive 
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light and highlighted the period of the war-time Slovak State, labelled by the 
newspaper as “the anniversary of a fulfilled dream” (Poláš, 2015). 
Further, the Governor of the Banská Bystrica Self-Governing Region, 
Marian Kotleba, hung out two black flags on the day of celebrating the Slovak 
National Uprising, 29 August 2015. Marian Kotleba has a clear stance towards 
the uprising. In the past he branded it as a red coup and labeled partisans as 
bandits. Several months before that, he ignored a resolution of members of the 
regional parliament and did not go to lay a wreath in Kremnička to 
commemorate the 750 victims of war, mostly the Jews, who died there (Vražda, 
2015).  
During the period before the 2016 parliamentary elections, Kotleba’s 
party also came to the public attention by holding meetings in different cities 
in Slovakia against the Islamisation of Europe, which had a connection with 
the ongoing migration crisis in Europe. The largest march took place in the 
capital city of Bratislava on 20 June 2015. During the anti-immigration 
demonstration, Kotleba provocatively wished the crowd a “nice white day”. 
Later, the EU flag was torn and burned. The rest of the speakers threatened 
parliament politicians with “settling the score with them” or defenestration and 
greeted the crowd with “On Guard!” (“Na stráž!”) used by members of the 
Hlinka Guards during the war-time Slovak State (Mikušovič, 2015). 
The 2016 parliamentary election manifesto was a modification of the 
populist slogans. According to them, many decent families live in appalling 
conditions, thieves in the government supposedly enjoy unprecedented luxury, 
and “parasites” have everything for free. They claim that they will give short 
shrift to “parasites in settlements” and protect people from the “growing Gypsy 
terror”. The manifesto continues with slogans against refugees 
(Naseslovensko.net, 2015). 
In the parliamentary elections of March 2016, Kotleba, ĽSNS 
surprisingly won 209,779  votes (8.04 %) and gained 14 out of 150 seats in 
the Slovak parliament (Štatistický úrad Slovenskej republiky, 2020). This 
brought a significant reaction not only in the Slovak media, but in the public 
and among politicians or experts.  
Only a few days after the success in the parliamentary elections, on 14 
March 2016, Kotleba’s MPs publicly commemorated the anniversary of the 
war-time Slovak State. The MPs laid flowers on Tiso’s grave and sang the 
Slavic song “Hey Slovaks” the national anthem of the Slovak State (Šnídl, 
2016). On the same day, Banská Bystrica’s Governor and member of the 
national parliament, Marian Kotleba, gave an instruction to unexpectedly end 
a stage play in Brezno. He did not like overtly emotional expressions in the 
artistic text. The impact of the official censorship was revealed before the 
performance. The office asked the actors to change or remove overly emotional 
and indecent expressions (Vražda, 2016). This was not the first time. In 2015 
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Kotleba thwarted a festival of a longstanding tradition, allegedly because it was 
about “decadent arts”. The Head of the Office of the Banská Bystrica Self-
Governing Region Milan Uhrík (currently a Kotleba’s party member of 
European Parliament) expressed the then official position that the shows of 
Divadlo Štúdio Tanca often go well beyond the borders of decency and 
morality (Kyseľ, 2015). 
The head of ĽSNS, Marian Kotleba, seemed to demonstrate his 
admiration for fascism again. As a member of parliament, he sent a letter to 
Andrej Danko, who was, at the time, Chair of the Parliament, requesting that 
he ask the members of parliament to observe a minute’s silence in their session 
on Monday 18 April 2016 to honour the memory of President of the war-time 
Slovak State, Jozef Tiso. In the letter, he writes that, 69 years ago on 18 April,  
a shameful judicial murder of the first president of the Slovak Republic and 
priest Jozef Tiso took place (Pacherová, 2016). 
Since April 2016 Kotleba’s party introduced the so-called patrols on 
trains. Originally, they were supposed to be the vanguard of a militia organized 
as a response to the crime rate on trains. The groups typically consisted of three 
shaven-headed men wearing green T-shirts with the party’s logo. These men 
would board trains and pretend to be officers of law and order, posing as 
guardians protecting the riders from “antisocial elements”, but in fact, they only 
raised fears among decent passengers. On trains the patrols draw particular 
attention to the Roma (Dugovič, 2016).  
In addition, the Kotleba’s party MPs decided to spend the money from 
the state budget to form militias. In response to this, the other MPs started to 
work on amending the legislative act on political parties. Political parties are 
likely to be prohibited from arming and forming their own armed forces. 
Similarly, they should also be prohibited from spending public funds on 
elections (TASR, 2016). 
Furthermore, the blogger Ján Benčík (currently a member of Slovak 
parliament) regularly demonstrates that many exponents of Kotleba’s party do 
not have a problem in publicly venerating (mostly on social networks) Hitler 
or in laying claim to the legacy of the Third Reich. Ján Benčík has become a 
“menace“ to the ĽSNS and because of him the party members and sympathisers 
have cancel their accounts on social networks and are ashamed to admit that 
they like the posts that they had previously shared (Kyseľ, 2016).  
The party also has foreign contacts outside Slovakia. For example, on 
their official website, in their report from their party meeting on 18 June 2016, 
they write that the formal part of the meeting included participation and 
speeches from foreign guests, in particular, the representatives of the Italian 
party Forza Nuova, the Greek Golden Dawn, the NPD from Germany and 
DSSS from the Czech Republic (Naseslovensko.net, 2016). All these parties 
may be seen as far-right groups. How the Slovak right-wing scene will further 
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develop remains a hypothetical question. Activities of ĽSNS continue in 
similar scandalous form. Almost every day there are new problems that are 
presented in the media. In the autumn of 2016, the Slovak Parliament approved 
an amendment of the anti-extremist laws. Within the Ministry of Interior, a new 
department to combat extremism has been created as well as new expert 
department of the Ministry of Justice, which deals with political and religious 
extremism. 
However, terms such as neo-fascism or neo-Nazism are from the field 
of political science, not legal concepts. From a legal point of view, it is very 
difficult to characterize the ideology of the movement and to point out its well-
hidden neo-Nazi character (Drábik, 2019). 
The proposal for the dissolution of a political party ĽSNS was 
submitted to the Supreme Court by General Prosecutor Jaromír Čižnár in May 
2017. According to the court in 2019, the most important element in the threat 
to democracy was element of immediacy. The Court found that the risk is not 
sufficiently imminent, as a political party ĽSNS has not enough deputies in 
parliament to passed legislation that could threaten democracy. The 
indictment's arguments were based on the fact that criminal proceedings were 
being conducted with the party's chairman (Kotleba) and two members of 
parliament from ĽSNS. According to the court, this could not be considered as 
an aggravating circumstance in the decision. The court said that ruled on the 
dissolution of the ĽSNS as an administrative court and not as a criminal court. 
According to the court, the action was insufficiently substantiated (TA3 & 
TASR, 2019). 
Marian Kotleba ran for the post of Slovak president in 2019 and in the 
first round of elections he finished in 4th place with about 223,000 votes, which 
represented 10.39% of the votes of participating voters. After the parliamentary 
elections in 2020 his party entered parliament with a 230,000 votes (7.97%) 
(Štatistický úrad Slovenskej republiky, 2020). The party continues a similar 
policy which it represented in the election period in 2016-2020. 
Kotleba is guilty since October 2020 of supporting and promoting a 
movement aimed at suppressing fundamental rights and freedoms. He was 
sentenced to four years and four months in prison. The judgment is not final. If 
the Supreme Court upheld the judgment of the Specialized Criminal Court, 
Kotleba would also lose his parliamentary mandate. Kotleba allegedly handed 
over checks in the amount of 1,488 euros as part of his charitable activities, 
which according to the indictment was not a coincidence. The prosecutor was 
convinced that the amount should be read separately as numbers 14 and 88. The 
first is a reference to the 14-word statement of the American racist David Lane: 
“We must protect the existence of our people and the future of white children.” 
The number 88 refers to the eighth letter of the alphabet - H. The two eights are 
two H, so a reference to the Nazi salute “Heil Hitler!” Court stated that the 
amounts on the checks referred to neo-Nazism. As one of the pieces of 
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evidence, the court used a donation contract for the amount of 1,488 euros, 
which, according to the judge, showed that the donor was not ĽSNS, but Marian 
Kotleba personally. According to the court, the numbers themselves have no 
meaning, but according to the court, such numbers have meaning only in 
connection with other circumstances that prove signs of extremism. The court 
spoke extensively about the extremist background of the ĽSNS and mentioned 
in particular the abuse of persons to whom sums of 1,488 euros were handed 
over. It was not about handing over aid, but about abusing people to promote 
“perverted fascist ideas.” According to the prosecutor's office, it was not 
accidental when Kotleba handed over the checks. It happened on March 14, 
2017 on the anniversary of the establishment of the Slovak state. The event 
took place in the auditorium and the footage shows a portrait of Jozef Tiso, the 
president of this state and a convicted war criminal (Mikušovič, 2020).  
The historian Jakub Drábik (2016) wrote an extraordinarily interesting 
article for the Slovak opinion-forming daily Denník N after the 2016 elections 
entitled “Is Marian Kotleba really a fascist?”. The leitmotiv of the article is a 
finding that what makes a fascist a fascist are not external signs but his mind 
sets. Kotleba and his supporters clearly condemn the existing political system 
and assume the role of an “anti-system movement”, just as all fascist parties in 
the world, in the past and present. The responsibility for the “ill-fated” state of 
society/ethnic group/nation in the eyes of fascists has always been carried by a 
real or invented groups, which, according to them, the nation/ethnic 
group/society/state they belong to or feel they belong to, must be “cleansed”. 
In the ĽSNS doctrine there are several internal and external enemies: the 
current elected and corrupted government and in general any politicians of 
“standard” political parties, the Roma ethnic group or the Jews. European 
civilization is according to ĽSNS threatened by Islam and refugees from 
outside. Kotleba wants to clean Slovakia of all that and impose “order”. And 
this is what makes him, according to Drábik, a fascist. Anyone who claims that 
he has changed, especially with his softer rhetoric and that he no longer 
marches in a uniform holding a garden torch, should draw a distinction between 
what Kotleba says and what he really thinks, or what he hides behind his words. 
Drábik refers to the British historian Roger Eatwell who, in the early 1990s, 
pointed out a significant difference between the esoteric (what fascists debate 
among themselves, in close circles) and exoteric (what they consider 
appropriate to say in public) appeal of fascist parties and movements. 
 
Conclusion 
Political party Kotlebovci - ĽSNS, not only on the basis of history and 
genealogy, programme and ideological platform, but also real political acts, 
and proven cooperation with similar parties, may be labelled as fascist. The 
Slovak initiative Stop Fascism believes that looking at the true intentions of the 
election manifesto of this party is the same as looking at promises for the 
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genocide of the Jews in the manifesto of Hitler’s NSDAP. The historical 
development of the ĽSNS, the speeches of its present or former candidates, the 
statements of its MPs and their overall activities at this time quite clearly show 
that the ĽSNS is extremist and fascist. This initiative summarised their beliefs 
in several points: Marian Kotleba is close to the hard-core neo-Nazi scene. In 
the past he personally supported events held by the extreme right. In the ĽSNS 
candidate list, ĽSNS members include persons with the neo-Nazi past and 
views. ĽSNS is the only party to give “the elite” of the Slovak neo-Nazi scene 
space in its candidate list – from Juden Mord’s frontman Rastislav Rogel to 
Marián Magát, a person who wishes Adolf Hitler a happy birthday and brands 
him as a splendid person, peacemaker and statesman. Magát has long laid claim 
to the legacy of the totalitarian fascist Slovak State and its ideology. The party 
has open speeches of anti-Semitism, racism, and they call Roma Gypsy 
extremists and parasites. Marian Kotleba has, in his political campaign, openly 
expressed anti-Semitism. In order to avoid prosecution, he frequently brands 
the Jews as Zionists, though he was more open in some of his older speeches. 
He has never distanced himself from those speeches saying, “I am still the same 
Kotleba” (Stopfašizmu.sk, 2016). 
According to Kluknavská and Smolík (2016) Kotleba´s political party 
is most determined extreme right party building upon issues of high political 
relevance, seizing the political and cultural opportunities which have opened 
up to it. Kotlebovci - ĽSNS altered its discourse to anti-establishment and anti-
minority framing and has been gradually successful in terms of mobilization 
and diffusion of nationalistic and xenophobic sentiments in some parts of 
population. ĽSNS is not so much an anti-establishment political party, it is 
primarily an anti-systemic, extremist political party. ĽSNS intention is to 
replace the existing socio-political system with another in which the basic 
features of a liberal-democratic political regime, a free market economy and an 
open, culturally, ethnically and religiously diversified society are absent 
(Gyarfášová – Mesežnikov, 2016). 
Despite the decision of the Supreme Court not to dissolve the political 
party ĽSNS, more sophisticated appearance and opening such topics, which are 
the agenda of other political entities, the ideological connection to the 
predecessors is noticeable. Members of the National Council of the Slovak 
Republic for Kotleba – ĽSNS (Milan Mazurek, Stanislav Mizík) are being 
prosecuted for racist statements against Roma, or against citizens of Slovakia 
of Jewish origin. At the same time, the members of the political party and the 
leader Marian Kotleba did not distance themselves from their previous 
statements promoting Nazism, fascism, denying the Holocaust and despising 
the Slovak National Uprising (Vasiľková, Androvičová, 2019). 
The Supreme Court concluded that the party's SP-NS activities as 
predecessor of ĽSNS were in conflict with the applicable legislation. The most 
critical point was the People's Program, in which the party called for the 
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creation of a corporatist state. It is about effectively restricting the right to vote 
of some citizens and creating an undemocratic political system (Drábik, 2019). 
The expert on the Slovak war state and historian Ivan Kamenec claims 
that Kotleba has not changed and is not moderate even today. Kamenec knew 
the programme and other documents of the banned Slovak Brotherhood. The 
current ĽSNS manifesto is similar, according to him, but in several regards 
and verbal expressions Kotleba is more cautions, sophisticated. He thinks that 
the ĽSNS, contrary to its predecessor, has not changed. However, Kotleba is 
left with his own anti-Roma, anti-Zionist (which is taken to mean anti-Semitic) 
themes, and in particular, unfulfillable promises of fast and simple solutions to 
all contemporary problems of society. Kamenec personally considers Kotleba 
to be a fascist because he took over some the World War II elements of Slovak 
fascism. Through intolerance, violence, promises of simple solutions, what he 
pursues is fascism. As a specific example of fascism, he organized marches to 
Roma settlements. Their sole objective was intimidation. And intimidation is, 
according to Kamenec one of the key hallmarks of fascism (Mikušovič, 2016). 
Kotleba´s and his political party ĽSNS previous activity and constant 
attacks on democracy and the democratic system, praising undemocratic 
regimes, declaring an effort to achieve an alternative to the current decadent 
era, a new era and brilliant tomorrows, international cooperation with similar 
movements, racist and anti-semitic expressions and the use of neo-semitic 
expressions point to the ideology of the party. The ĽSNS is a neo-Nazi party, 
belonging to a larger family of fascist movements (Drábik, 2019). 
Coincidentally the Slovak society is at the stage that it is for various 
reasons willing to support these and similar subjects, its candidates and 
manifesto, in elections and demonstrations in a significant number, as it used 
to be in the past in Slovakia, but also in the democratic political systems of 
liberal democracies. Most members of society, as well as the political and 
intellectual elite, should be aware of the rise of extremism. The political and 
intellectual elites have a slightly greater political and moral responsibility for 
the situation. Besides the actual work for the benefit of the citizens, public 
welfare and society as such, political and intellectual elites should clearly 
promote and appeal to the values and principles of democracy, on the other 
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